The Constitutionality of Utah\u27s 2005 Tuition Tax Credit Proposals by Mullaney, Sean W
1THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UTAH’S 2005 TUITION TAX CREDIT PROPOSALS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For the past several years, Utah’s Legislature has considered elementary and secondary 
school choice plans, including tuition tax credits.1 While the Legislature has yet to enact a 
school-choice regime, the issue continues to play a prominent role in Utah politics.2 In 2005 the 
Legislature considered, but failed to adopt, three proposals for a tuition tax credit.3 Tuition tax 
credits to encourage school choice present two Constitutional issues: (1) potential violations of 
the Establishment Clause4 and (2) potential violations of the Equal Protection Clause.5 School 
choice programs, including tuition tax credits and vouchers, are still a source of controversy.6
Tuition tax credits can run afoul of the Establishment Clause if they impermissibly 
advance religion.7 As tuition tax credits help fund religious schools, they must be crafted to 
provide government aid that is neutral with respect to religion and funnel aid to religious schools 
only as a result of genuine and independent choices by a broad group of parents.8 Tuition tax 
credits might also violate the Equal Protection Clause if state legislatures structure them to treat 
similarly situated parents in a dissimilar fashion for no legitimate state purpose.9
This Comment will examine the three 2005 Utah tuition tax credit proposals in light of 
the Establishment Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. This Comment is not a normative 
policy analysis: it makes no policy conclusions on the desirability or efficacy of tuition tax 
 
1 Matt Canham, School-voucher Group Hopes to Oust Opponents, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Mar. 13, 2006, at B1. 
2 Id. 
3 Infra Part II. 
4 Infra Part IV.A. 
5 Infra Part IV.B. 
6 E.g., Harry G. Hutchison, Liberal Hegemony? School Vouchers and the Future of the Race, 68 MO. L. REV. 559, 
(2003); Robert A. Sedler, Understanding the Establishment Clause: The Perspective of Constitutional Litigation, 43 
WAYNE L. REV. 1317 (1997); Deborah Katz Levi, Comment, Tuition Tax Credit Proposals in Utah – Their 
Constitutionality and Feasibility, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1047 (2005). 
7 Infra Part IV.A. 
8 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002). 
9 See John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Sales and Use Tax Credits, Discrimination Against Interstate 
Commerce, and the Useless Multiple Tax Concept, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 273, 302 (1987). 
2credits in Utah. Rather, this Comment presents a positive Constitutional analysis of the three 
proposals in light of the current state of Supreme Court jurisprudence in the areas of the 
Establishment Clause and Equal Protection. This Comment argues that all three 2005 Utah 
tuition tax credit proposals conform to the requirements of the Establishment Clause. This 
Comment further argues that only one of the three tuition tax credit proposals is valid under the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
Part II discusses in detail the attributes of the three tax credit proposals before the Utah 
Legislature in 2005. Part III of the Comment discusses the Supreme Court’s Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence, with particular focus on school choice programs and the court’s 2002 
decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris. Part III also analyzes Supreme Court cases regarding 
state tax laws and the Equal Protection Clause. Part IV presents a positive analysis of the tuition 
tax credit proposals under both Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause frameworks 
and offers recommendations for the Utah Legislature’s future consideration of tuition tax credit 
proposals. 
II. The 2005 Utah Tuition Tax Credit Proposals 
 
In 2005, the Utah Legislature considered three versions of H.R. 39, Tuition Tax Credits.10 
For purposes of this Paper, these versions shall be referred to as the “Original” (dated December 
15, 2004),11 the “First Substitute” (dated January 27, 2005),12 and the “Second Substitute” (dated 
February 10, 2005).13 The final version, the Second Substitute, failed in the Utah House of 
 
10 Tuition Tax Credits, H.R. 39, 56th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005), available at 
http://www.le.state.ut.us/~2005/bills/hbillint/hb0039.pdf; Tuition Tax Credits, H.R. 39 1st Substitute, 56th Leg., 
Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005), available at http://www.le.state.ut.us/~2005/bills/hbillint/hb0039s01.pdf; Tuition Tax 
Credits, H.R. 39 2d Substitute, 56th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005), available at 
http://www.le.state.ut.us/~2005/bills/hbillamd/hb0039s02.pdf. 
11 Tuition Tax Credits, H.R. 39, 56th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005). 
12 Tuition Tax Credits, H.R. 39 1st Substitute, 56th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005). 
13 Tuition Tax Credits, H.R. 39 2d Substitute, 56th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005). 
3Representatives on February 25, 2005 by a vote of 34 to 40.14 Parental choice programs for 
elementary and secondary schools have failed for several consecutive years in the Utah 
Legislature.15 In 2006, a school voucher program did not pass the Utah Legislature, as the bill’s 
sponsor, believing he did not have the required votes for passage, pulled the measure from House 
consideration.16 Among the reasons for offering tuition tax credits in Utah were to empower 
parents to make the best educational decision for children and to relieve financially strapped 
Utah public schools from the burden of increasing numbers of students.17 
While similar, there were important differences between the three bills.  The Original 
Tuition Tax Credit bill provided a refundable tax credit against individual income taxes for 
amounts paid to a private school as tuition on behalf of a qualifying student.18 The bill limited 
the tuition tax credit to the lesser of 50% of tuition expenses for private elementary and 
secondary school, up to a maximum credit of the lesser of (1) $2,000 or (2) $3,000 minus the 
total amount of tuition grants the student received.19 The proposal created a refundable credit, 
meaning that a taxpayer claiming the credit might not pay any Utah income tax and might also 
receive a tax refund from the state.20 For example, Harry has a 2006 Utah state income tax 
liability of $1,000 before considering a tuition tax credit. Harry paid $4,000 in tuition to a private 
 
14 Utah H.R., 56th Leg., Gen. Sess., Vote Tabulation Tuition Tax Credits (Feb. 25, 2005), available at 
http://www.le.state.ut.us/~2005/status/hbillsta/hb0039s2.002h.txt. 
15 Jennifer Toomer-Cook, Science Ed Bill Sees Defeat, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Utah), March 2, 2006; Matt 
Canham, School-voucher Group Hopes to Oust Opponents, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, March 13, 2006, at B1. 
16 Jennifer Toomer-Cook, Science Ed Bill Sees Defeat, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Utah), March 2, 2006; Matt 
Canham, School-voucher Group Hopes to Oust Opponents, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, March 13, 2006, at B1. 
17 Royce Van Tassell, Position Paper for Tuition Tax Credits, in Utah State Univ., Estimating Demand and Supply 
Response to Tuition Tax Credits for Private School Tuition in Utah 79 (Nov. 1, 2004) available at: 
http://www.edexutah.org/pdfs/FinalDraft-pdfformat1.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2006). 
18 Tuition Tax Credits, H.R. 39, 56th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005). 
19 Id.  
20 See Sean W. Mullaney, Comment, More Than Just a Diploma: Roth IRA Conversions Sheltered by the Lifetime 
Learning Credit, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV (forthcoming 2007).  
4elementary school for his son Harry Jr. Under the Original H.R. 39’s tuition tax credit, Harry 
would not pay any income tax, and would receive a $1,000 check from the State of Utah.21 
The student had to be a “qualifying student” meaning the student was not enrolled in a 
private school on January 1, 2005 and was not enrolled in a private school kindergarten during 
the 2005-2006 school year.22 Essentially, only children transferring from a public school to a 
private school would be eligible for the credit.23 Parents could claim the tuition credit for a 
qualifying private school, broadly defined as an elementary and secondary school not controlled 
by a governmental entity.24 It is important to note that the Original bill did not contain any 
adjusted gross income25 limitation on the ability to claim the tuition tax credit.26 As long as the 
taxpayer paid the private school tuition of their qualifying dependent child, they could claim the 
Utah tuition tax credit regardless of their annual income.27 
The Original bill also included a nonrefundable28 tax credit against Utah income taxes for 
contributions to scholarship granting organizations (“SGOs”).29 An SGO is a private 
 
21 The credit is fifty percent of $4,000, which equals $2,000. Harry’s income tax is $1,000 less the $2,000 tuition tax 
credit.  As the credit is refundable, Harry winds up with $1,000 from the State of Utah. Essentially Harry has a 
negative tax liability to the State of Utah for 2006 of $1,000. 
22 Tuition Tax Credits, H.R. 39, 56th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005); contra Deborah Katz Levi, Comment, Tuition 
Tax Credit Proposals in Utah – Their Constitutionality and Feasibility, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1047, 1056-57 (2005). 
Deborah Katz Levi writes that only individuals whose children were already in private schools on January 1, 2005 
(or moved into Utah after that date) could claim the tuition tax credit under the original H.R. 39. Id. My reading of 
the Original version of H.R. 39 does not agree with that interpretation of the proposed statute. 
23 Note this would mean the vast majority of Utah’s school children would be eligible for the tuition tax credit, as 97 
percent of Utah’s school children attend public school.  Editorial, Reject Guesswork, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE,
December 30, 2004, at A12. 
24 Tuition Tax Credits, H.R. 39, 56th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005). 
25 Adjusted gross income is a federal income tax concept.  Generally it is the total of items of income less certain 
allowed deductions.  Internal Revenue Service Form 1040, “U.S. Individual Income Tax Return”; see Sean W. 
Mullaney, Comment, More Than Just a Diploma: Roth IRA Conversions Sheltered by the Lifetime Learning Credit,
14 GEO. MASON L. REV (forthcoming 2007).   
26 Tuition Tax Credits, H.R. 39, 56th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005). 
27 Id.   
28 A nonrefundable tax credit, as opposed to a refundable tax credit, can only reduce a taxpayer’s tax to zero, and it 
cannot create a negative tax liability. If the credit discussed in the previous example was nonrefundable, then 
Harry’s tax for 2006 would be zero, and Harry would not receive $1,000 from the State of Utah. See Sean W. 
Mullaney, Comment, More Than Just a Diploma: Roth IRA Conversions Sheltered by the Lifetime Learning Credit,
14 GEO. MASON L. REV (forthcoming 2007).  
5organization that raises money and provides private scholarships to students to attend private 
schools.30 As the Original version was the only one to propose this nonrefundable credit for SGO 
contributions,31 this Paper will not discuss this aspect of Utah’s tuition tax credit or analyze its 
validity under the Constitution. 
 The First Substitute version of H.R. 39 changed the structure of the proposed tuition tax 
credit.  First, it offered a full credit, as opposed to a fifty percent credit, on eligible amounts of 
tuition paid to a private school.32 However this version means-tested the credit’s availability, 
meaning the ability to claim the credit varied inversely with one’s federal adjusted gross 
income.33 The bill allowed a refundable tax credit of up to $3,750 in tuition paid for taxpayers 
whose federal adjusted gross income was equal to 100 percent or less of the “maximum annual 
income allowed to qualify for reduced priced meals for the applicable household size as 
published by the U.S. Department of Agriculture.”34 The proposal had a sliding scale for the 
ability to claim the refundable tuition tax credit based on the household’s adjusted gross income 
as a percentage of the household’s maximum income for qualifying for federal school meal 
assistance as follows:35 
Percentage of federal school reduced price meal 
assistance maximum income 
Maximum Tuition Tax Credit 
100% or less $3,750 
Greater than 100% but less than or equal to 125% $3,500 
29 Tuition Tax Credits, H.R. 39, 56th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005). 
30 Deborah Katz Levi, Comment, Tuition Tax Credit Proposals in Utah – Their Constitutionality and Feasibility,
2005 UTAH L. REV. 1047, 1049 (2005). 
31 See Tuition Tax Credits, H.R. 39 1st Substitute, 56th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005); Tuition Tax Credits, H.R. 39 
2d Substitute, 56th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005). 
32 Tuition Tax Credits, H.R. 39 1st Substitute, 56th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005). 
33 Id.  
34 Id.  
35 Id.  
6Greater than 125% but less than or equal to 150% $3,250 
Greater than 150% but less than or equal to 175% $3,000 
Greater than 175% but less than or equal to 200% $2,750 
Greater than 200% but less than or equal to 225% $2,500 
Greater than 225% but less than or equal to 250% $1,750 
Greater than 250% but less than or equal to 275% $1,000 
Greater than 275% but less than or equal to 300% $500 
As observed by Ronnie Lynn of The Salt Lake Tribune, a family of five with an adjusted 
gross income of $40,756 qualified for a $3,750 tuition tax credit, while a family of five with an 
adjusted gross income of $112,000 qualified for a $500 tuition tax credit.36 
The First Substitute also expanded the number of qualifying students.  As long as a 
student attended a private school, the proposal considered them a qualifying student.37 In the 
Original version a student had to switch from a public school to a private school for the parents 
to claim the credit.38 Under the First Substitute, parents of students already attending private 
schools and parents of children who switched to private schools could claim the tuition tax 
credit, so long as they met the adjusted gross income qualifications.39 
The First Substitute differed from the Original version in that it had explicit legislative 
findings.40 One of these findings was that parents are best equipped to make decisions for their 
children, including where their child should attend school.41 Another finding stated that children 
 
36 Ronnie Lynn, New Approach on Tax Credits, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, January 27, 2005 at B1. 
37 Tuition Tax Credits, H.R. 39 1st Substitute, 56th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005). 
38 Tuition Tax Credits, H.R. 39, 56th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005). 
39 Ronnie Lynn, New Approach on Tax Credits, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, January 27, 2005 at B1. 
40 Tuition Tax Credits, H.R. 39 1st Substitute, 56th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005). 
41 Id.  
7and families are the primary beneficiaries of the tuition tax credit program, and any benefit to 
private schools, “sectarian or otherwise, is purely incidental.”42 The Legislature also found that 
the bill is “for the valid secular purpose of tailoring a student’s education to that student’s 
specific needs” and the tuition tax credit program is “neutral with respect to religion.”43 The 
findings also state that parents using the program might direct “resources to religious and secular 
schools solely as a result of their genuine and independent private choices.”44 The First 
Substitute, unlike the Original version, contained a $1,500,000 appropriation from the General 
Fund to the State Board of Education.45 The Board would distribute this money to public school 
districts that “demonstrated measurable financial harm” from the credit’s enactment.46 
The Second Substitute, the one ultimately defeated in the House, featured many of the 
same things as the First Substitute. It included the same adjusted gross income limitations on 
taking the tuition tax credit, the same $1.5 million appropriation the Board of Education, and the 
same legislative findings.47 However, this version restricted the definition of a “qualifying 
student.”48 Under the Second Substitute, a qualifying student was someone who meets at least 
one of the following criteria: 
i. Was born after September 1, 1999; 
ii. Was enrolled as a full-time student in a Utah public school on January 1, 2005; 
iii. Was not a Utah resident on January 1, 2005; or 
iv. Was a private school student for whom a taxpayer paid or incurred the tuition 
expenses, and the adjusted gross income of the taxpayer was less than or equal 
to 100% of the income guideline for reduced priced school meals.49 
42 Id.  
43 Id.  
44 Id.  
45 Id.  
46 Id.  
47 Tuition Tax Credits, H.R. 39 2d Substitute, 56th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005). 
48 Id.  
49 Id.  
8This new definition of a qualified child prohibited all but the poorest of parents of 
children already in private school from utilizing the tuition tax credit.50 This addressed fiscal 
concerns about allowing all parents of children previously in private schools to take the credit, 
even subject to the adjusted gross income limitations of the First and Second Substitutes.51 One 
estimate put the cost to the Utah fisc of extending the tax credit to all parents with children 
already in private schools (subject to the adjusted gross income limitations) at $38 million.52 As 
previously noted, the Second Substitute failed in the House of Representatives by a vote of 34 in 
favor and 40 against.53 
III. Tuition Tax Credits and the Establishment Clause 
 
a. The Evolving Lemon Test 
 
According to the First Amendment, “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion.”54 This provision, better known as the Establishment Clause, is how 
school choice programs, including tuition tax credits, can run afoul of the Constitution.55 
Establishment Clause questions often arise as religiously affiliated schools are among the many 
private schools available to parents utilizing school choice programs. Since the 1970’s, Supreme 
Court jurisprudence on the Establishment Clause has not been entirely consistent.56 One of the 
leading cases in this area is the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman.57 
In Lemon the court invalidated, on Establishment Clause grounds, a Rhode Island statute 
that supplemented the salaries of teachers in nonpublic (including religious) schools and a 
 
50 Ronnie Lynn, Bill Scales Back Tuition Tax Break, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, February 9, 2005, at A11. 
51 Id.  
52 Id.  
53 Utah H.R., 56th Leg., Gen. Sess., Vote Tabulation Tuition Tax Credits (Feb. 25, 2005), available at 
http://www.le.state.ut.us/~2005/status/hbillsta/hb0039s2.002h.txt. 
54 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
55 E.g., Sedler, supra note 6; Levi, supra note 6, at 1051. 
56 Hutchison, supra note 6, at 605 (observing that “[w]hether [the Supreme Court] has always preserved the 
consistency it desires [in Establishment Clause jurisprudence] is debatable”). 
57 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Sedler, supra note 6, at 1319.  
9Pennsylvania statute that directly reimbursed nonpublic (including religious) schools for 
expenditures for things such as teacher salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials.58 In doing 
so, the court laid out a three-pronged test for whether a statute violates the Establishment Clause: 
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect 
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.’ (citations omitted).59 
In Lemon, the court held that the statutes in question did have a secular purpose, namely, 
improving the quality of all education in their states.60 The court indicated it would be 
deferential to the States when determining if statutes had valid secular legislative intent.61 The 
court passed on the second prong, but held that these direct state payments to religious schools 
constituted an excessive entangling of religion and government.62 
Over the past thirty-five years, Supreme Court jurisprudence refined and fine-tuned the 
Lemon test. Writing for the majority in Agostini v. Felton in 1997, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
wrote that the third prong of the Lemon test (excessive government entanglement) has mostly 
been used to analyze Lemon’s second prong, whether or not the statute advances or inhibits 
religion.63 Justice Clarence Thomas later put the final nail in the coffin of a separately standing 
third prong of the Lemon test in Mitchell v. Helms.64 Justice Thomas wrote that test for 
determining whether a statute violates the Establishment Clause is really just the first two prongs 
of the Lemon test, i.e., secular legislative purpose and advancing or inhibiting religion.65 The 
original third prong is really just a sub-prong of the advancing or inhibiting religion test.66 Justice 
 
58 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607, 609-11. 
59 Id. at 612-13.  
60 Id. at 613.  
61 Id.  
62 Id. at 613-14.  
63 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-33 (1997); Levi, supra note 6, at 1052. 
64 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807 (2000). 
65 Id.  
66 Id.  
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Thomas laid out a rule for determining when “government aid has the effect of advancing 
religion: It does not result in governmental indoctrination; define its recipients by reference to 
religion; or create an excessive entanglement.”67 
Whether or not a statute advances religion is now of primary importance in Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence, particularly in the educational realm. First, for political reasons, few 
legislatures are going to pass laws inhibiting private religious schools. Second, a long line of 
Supreme Court cases have held that when analyzing the first Lemon prong, secular purpose, the 
state legislature must be afforded a wide range of deference: if any secular purpose can be found 
for the statute, it will pass Lemon’s first prong.68 
b. Zelman 
 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, decided in 2002, is the Supreme Court’s most recent 
comprehensive treatment of a school choice program under the Establishment Clause.69 Zelman 
considered the validity of an Ohio school voucher program for parents and children in 
Cleveland.70 Cleveland’s public schools had been among the worst in the nation for more than a 
generation, and students in Cleveland’s public schools performed much worse than their peers in 
other Ohio public schools.71 Among other disheartening statistics, more than two-thirds of public 
high school students dropped or failed out before graduation.72 
67 Id. at 808 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997)).  
68 E.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983) (stating “[l]ittle time need be spend on the question of 
whether the Minnesota tax deduction has a secular purpose” and concluding that the Court is reluctant to attribute 
unconstitutional motives to the States when plausible secular purposes can be gleaned from the statute); Comm. for 
Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973) (holding that a New York tax credit program 
for private school tuition had the valid secular purpose of improving education); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 
613 (holding that Rhode Island and Pennsylvania programs of payments directly to private schools, including 
religious schools, had the valid secular purpose of enhancing the quality of secular education in all schools, and 
noting the Court will generally grant a fair amount of deference on the secular purpose prong). 
69 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 539 U.S. 639 (2002); see Hutchison, supra note 6, at 560. 
70 Zelman, 539 U.S. at 644. 
71 Id.  
72 Id.  
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 Under the Ohio school choice program, only parents in the Cleveland school district 
qualified for a school voucher.73 Parents could use the voucher at any private school that decided 
to participate in the program, including religious and nonreligious schools.74 Schools could 
participate so long as the school agreed to certain conditions, such as not teaching hatred and not 
discriminating based on race, ethnicity, religion or national origin.75 Public schools adjacent to 
Cleveland could also elect to participate in the program.76 
School vouchers were distributed to parents for their children based upon financial 
need.77 Families with incomes of 200% and below the federal poverty line received ninety 
percent of tuition up to a cap of $2,250, while all other families received seventy-five percent of 
tuition costs, up to a cap of $1,875.78 Those parents who chose to keep their children in 
Cleveland’s public schools could utilize vouchers for costs associated with tutors for their 
students.79 Ohio reimbursed poor parents for ninety percent of tutoring costs, up to a cap of $360, 
while all other parents received a seventy-five percent reimbursement.80 
As part of the effort to improve education in the city, Cleveland started a community 
school program.81 Community schools are publicly funded schools that operate independent of 
the normal state educational bureaucracy and must accept students by lottery.82 Additionally, 
magnet schools, public schools “that emphasize a particular subject area, teaching method, or 
service to students” were established in Cleveland as part of the plan to improve the quality of 
 
73 Id. at 644-45.  
74 Id. at 645. 
75 Id.  
76 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 645 (2002). 
77 Id. at 646. 
78 Id.  
79 Id.  
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
82 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 647 (2002). 
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Cleveland’s education.83 Fifty-six private schools participated in the Cleveland school voucher 
program, while no public schools adjacent to Cleveland elected to participate.84 Forty-six of the 
private schools (eighty-two percent) had a religious affiliation.85 More than 3,700 students 
participated in the voucher program, and most (ninety-six percent) enrolled in a religiously 
affiliated school.86 
Analyzing this program under the Establishment Clause, the late Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist used the two-pronged version of the Lemon test announced in Agostini.87 In Zelman 
there was no dispute as to whether the Ohio voucher program violated the first prong (secular 
purpose) of the Lemon test.88 The program served the valid secular purpose of providing 
educational assistance to children in a failing public school system.89 Hence the Court only 
analyzed the “effect” prong, i.e., whether the program had the purpose or effect of advancing or 
inhibiting religion.90 
The fact that this program was not direct aid to religious schools proved important in the 
Supreme Court’s analysis.91 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that there is an important difference 
between direct aid to religious schools and “programs of true private choice, in which 
government aid reaches religious schools only as a result of the genuine and independent choices 
of private individuals.”92 Citing Mueller v. Allen, Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the 
Blind, and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., Chief Justice Rehnquist noted: 
 
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 647. 
85 Id.  
86 Id.  
87 Id. at 648-49 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23). 
88 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648-49 (2002). 
89 Id.  
90 Id.  
91 Id. at 649. 
92 Id. (citations omitted). 
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 Our jurisprudence with respect to true private choice programs has remained consistent 
and unbroken. Three times we have confronted Establishment Clause challenges to neutral 
government programs that provide aid directly to a broad class of individuals, who, in turn, direct 
that aid to religious schools or other institutions of their own choosing.  Three times we have 
rejected such challenges.93 
Cases such as Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest illustrate useful principles in analyzing 
statutes challenged under the Establishment Clause. In Mueller the Court rejected a challenge to 
a Minnesota program authorizing a tax deduction for private school tuition, even though ninety-
six percent of the program’s beneficiaries attended religiously affiliated schools.94 The Court in 
Mueller stated that it was irrelevant to the Establishment Clause analysis that the vast majority of 
benefiting parents chose religiously affiliated schools.95 Relevant factors included that religious 
schools only benefited after numerous private choices by parents and that the program gave “no 
imprimatur of state approval” to any one religion or religion in general.96 
Witters, upholding a tuition aid program that a student used to attend a religious 
institution to become a pastor, also supports the principle that if, when looking at the state 
program as a whole, the “aid . . . that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a 
result of the genuinely independent and private choices” then the program does not have the 
purpose or effect of advancing religion.97 In Zobrest the Court rejected an Establishment Clause 
challenge to a federal program that permitted sign-language interpreters to assist deaf-children in 
religious schools.98 The Court held that “governmental programs that neutrally provide benefits 
to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily subject to an 
 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 649-50.  
95 Id. at 650.  
96 Id.  
97 Id. at 650-51 (quoting Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986)).  
98 Id. at 651.  
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Establishment Clause challenge.”99 The Court noted this program distributed benefits neutrally to 
any child classified as “disabled.”100 
After reviewing these three cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist elucidated a rule: 
Where a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and provides assistance 
directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly 
as a result of their own genuine and independent private choice, the program is not readily subject 
to challenge under the Establishment Clause.101 
The Court upheld the validity of the Ohio program under the Establishment Clause.102 
The majority held this plan was neutral in all aspects with respect to religion.103 The only 
preference shown in this program was toward lower income families (who received a greater 
degree of financial assistance) and the program had no financial incentive toward religious 
schools.104 Additionally, the Ohio program permitted parents to choose among options that are 
private and public, secular and religious, and thus it was a program of true private choice.105 
In upholding the Ohio school voucher program, the Court distinguished it away from the 
facts of Comm. for Pub. Educ. And Religious Liberty v. Nyquist where the Supreme Court, in 
1973, invalidated a New York tax credit for parents of students attending private schools.106 The 
Court noted that the challenged New York law in Nyquist sought to give financial support for 
struggling private schools.107 Further, the New York program flatly excluded students in public 
schools, while the Ohio program included both private and public school students.108 The Court 
 
99 Id. (quoting Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993)).  
100 Id. (citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993)).  
101 Id. at 652.  
102 Id. at 644.  
103 Id. at 653.  
104 Id.  
105 Id. at 662.  
106 Id. at 661.  
107 Id.  
108 Id.  
15
emphasized the multitude of choices available to Cleveland parents in upholding the Ohio school 
voucher program.109 
c. Tuition and Taxes: Two Supreme Court Analyses 
 
Two Supreme Court cases mentioned in Zelman bear some discussion in order to 
properly analyze Utah’s tuition tax credit proposals under the Establishment Clause: Mueller v. 
Allen110 and Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist.111 In Mueller, the Supreme 
Court considered, and upheld, a Minnesota tax deduction for tuition paid for elementary and 
secondary school tuition.112 Parents with students in both public and private schools could deduct 
tuition and other related costs for Minnesota income tax purposes.113 First the Court quickly 
handled the first prong of the Lemon test, stating that Minnesota’s decision to defray costs 
incurred by parents for their children’s schooling evidences a purpose that is both secular and 
reasonable.114 The Court also upheld the tax deduction under Lemon’s second prong, noting both 
that the tax deduction was broadly available to all parents115 (i.e., parents of both public and 
private school children) and that any benefits accruing to private schools, including religious 
schools, was the result of many independent choices by parents.116 
In Nyquist, a 1973 case, the Supreme Court held a New York state tax benefit for the 
parents of private school students violated the Establishment Clause, specifically the second 
prong of the Lemon test.117 The New York law allowed parents with incomes under $25,000 who 
had children attending nonpublic schools to deduct a set amount (according to a statutory table) 
 
109 Id. at 662. 
110 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
111 Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
112 Mueller, 463 U.S. at 391. 
113 Id. at 397.  
114 Id. at 395.  
115 Id. at 397. 
116 Id. at 399. 
117 Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973). 
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from income for New York State tax purposes.118 The deductible amount had nothing to do with 
the actual tuition paid: so long as the parent had a child in a nonpublic school, the parent could 
deduct the statutorily prescribed amount.119 The program did not allow deductions for parents 
with children in public schools.120 
While the Court ultimately invalidated this law, it ruled that this tax deduction did not 
violate the first prong of the Lemon test. Justice Lewis Powell, writing for the Court, found valid 
secular purposes, including promoting diversity in the educational system and concern for an 
overburdened public school system.121 The second prong presented a serious problem for the 
New York statute.122 Justice Powell found the questioned statute aimed to keep parents sending 
their children to religious schools.123 Justice Powell also found that another significant purpose 
of the statute was to provide financial support for struggling private schools.124 These 
conclusions led the Supreme Court to find the New York program violated the second prong of 
the Lemon test, namely that the statute had a “primary effect that advances religion.”125 
d. Distinctions Among Taxpayers and the Equal Protection Clause 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution states, in part, “nor shall any State . . . . 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”126 The Equal 
Protection Clause applies to distinctions among taxpayers made by state tax laws.127 However, 
the Supreme Court is rather deferential to state legislatures in determining valid distinctions in 
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126 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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state taxation,128 and unless the distinction serves no legitimate state interest,129 the Court will 
usually deem it valid under the Equal Protection Clause. 
 Madden v. Commonwealth of Kentucky is a leading case for the proposition that the Court 
will grant state legislatures a sizeable amount of deference when making distinctions among 
taxpayers.130 The court explained that “[t]raditionally classification has been a device for fitting 
tax programs to local needs and usages in order to achieve an equitable distribution of the tax 
burden.”131 In Madden the Court upheld a statute that placed an ad valorem tax on bank deposits 
outside Kentucky of fifty cents per $100 and a ten cents per $100 on deposits in Kentucky.132 
The Court found that difficulties in collecting taxes on out-of-state accounts rationally justified 
the much higher tax rate on out-of-state accounts, and thus held the distinction between in and 
out-of-state accounts for tax purposes valid under the Equal Protection Clause.133 
Drastic differences in tax liabilities for similarly situated taxpayers can pass muster under 
the Equal Protection Clause so long as there is a “plausible policy reason” for the differing tax 
classifications.134 In Nordlinger v. Hahn the Supreme Court upheld California’s famous 
Proposition 13, a law that capped the annual increase in assessed home value at two percent 
annually.135 The state could only increase the assessed value to fair market value when the house 
changed hands.136 This meant long-term home owners paid much less in taxes than more recent 
buyers of similar homes.137 The appellant claimed having bought her house in November 1988, 
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135 Id. at 5.  
136 Id.  
137 Id. at 7.  
18
she would pay about $19,000 in property taxes over the ten years starting with 1989.138 Her 
neighbor, who purchased a comparable home in 1975, would only pay about $4,100 in property 
taxes over the same period.139 
Despite this large disparity in the property tax paid by similarly situated taxpayers, the 
Court held Proposition 13 valid under the Equal Protection Clause.140 The Court found two 
legitimate State interests to uphold the distinction.141 First, California had a legitimate interest in 
maintaining stable neighborhoods with limited turnover, and limiting increases in property taxes 
rationally served that purpose.142 Second, California had a legitimate interest in having existing 
homeowners not be harmed by two and three fold increases in the value of their homes (which 
happened in parts of California in the 1970s143), and Proposition 13’s cap on increases in the 
assessed value rationally served that interest.144 The cap allowed homebuyers to accurately 
predict their future property tax liabilities before purchasing a home and the Court noted reliance 
interests are usually highly valid and not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.145 Further, it 
is equitable to protect homeowners from paying taxes on large unrealized paper gains in the 
value of their homes.146 
While courts afford state tax distinctions a large amount of deference, they are not always 
valid under the Equal Protection Clause.147 For example, in Williams v. Vermont the Court struck 
down a Vermont tax credit for sales taxes paid to other states on out of state personal property 
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purchases when the statute granted the credit only to taxpayers who were residents of Vermont at 
the time of the purchase.148 This meant that if Taxpayer A, a Vermont resident, bought a car out-
of-state on January 1st and paid an out-of-state sales tax, he did not have to pay the Vermont use 
tax.149 However, if Taxpayer B, an out-of-state resident on January 1st, bought the same car in the 
same state and paid the same tax on January 1st, and then moved to Vermont on February 1st, he
would also have to pay the Vermont use tax.150 
The Court held that this tax credit made a distinction between resident and nonresident 
taxpayers that served no legitimate state interest.151 The use tax went into a fund for the repair 
and maintenance of Vermont highways.152 The Court noted that the distinction between 
taxpayers (whether or not they were a resident when the out-of-state purchase was made) bore no 
rational relation to the statutory purpose of the tax (raising money for highways).153 
Distinctions among taxpayers based on past differences can also violate the Equal 
Protection Clause.154 In Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, the Supreme Court invalidated a 
New Mexico $2,000 property tax exemption for those Vietnam veterans who resided in New 
Mexico before May 8, 1976.155 This meant that a Vietnam veteran who moved to New Mexico in 
1981 did not qualify for the tax exemption, while veterans who resided in the state before the 
statutory date received the exemption.156 
The Court ruled that the distinction made by the statute bore no rational relation to 
encouraging veterans to move to the state and there was no evidence that veterans who moved to 
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New Mexico before May 8, 1976 were more deserving of a property tax exemption than veterans 
who moved to the state after May 8th.157 Further, this amounted to a continuing tax benefit for 
living in New Mexico long after 1976 solely based on living in the state before May 8, 1976.158 
The statute’s wording also allowed for veterans who lived in New Mexico as infants, later served 
in Vietnam, and then moved back to New Mexico long after 1976 to claim the credit (as they had 
been “residents” of the state before May 8, 1976).159 Based on these facts, the Court ruled that 
the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause by creating two classes of resident Vietnam 
veterans in New Mexico, based on residency before and after May 8, 1976, for no legitimate 
state interest.160 
IV. The Validity of Utah’s Tuition Tax Credit Proposal Under the Constitution 
 
a. Establishment Clause Analysis 
 
This subpart will first analyze the tuition tax credit proposals in light of the Zelman 
decision, and then it will compare and contrast the Utah proposals to the facts in Mueller and 
Nyquist.
1. The Utah Proposals Under Zelman 
 
First, the Utah proposals satisfy the first Lemon test, namely, it has valid secular 
purposes. Secular purposes for the proposals include wanting to empower parents to make the 
best choice for their children’s education161 and ensuring that Utah’s public schools are not 
swamped with growing numbers of students.162 So long as the court can find a valid secular 
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purpose, the court will give great deference to legislatures on this test,163 and there is no reason 
to believe the court would not afford these tuition tax credit proposals that deference.164 
Zelman provides the most important rules for analyzing the validity of the 2005 Utah 
tuition tax credit proposals under the second prong of Lemon. In order for the proposals to not 
advance or inhibit religion, and thus to be valid under the Establishment Clause, they must: (1) 
be neutral with respect to religion; (2) provide assistance to a broad class of individuals; and, (3) 
direct government aid to religious schools as a result of genuine and independent private 
choices.165 
All three of the proposals are neutral with respect to religion. They allow parents to claim 
tuition tax credits at a broad array of private schools. There are at least 118 private schools in 
Utah, and about seventy of them are not religiously affiliated.166 Of the at least forty-eight that 
are religiously affiliated, they represent a variety of religions: fifteen are Roman Catholic, three 
are Mormon,167 twenty-nine are other Christian denominations, and one is Islamic.168 There is 
also at least one Jewish private school in Utah.169 As Utah’s tuition tax credits proposals could 
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support nonreligious private schools, and private schools of various religions, the proposals are 
neutral with respect to religion. 
All three proposals provide assistance to a broad class of individuals. Ninety-seven 
percent of Utah’s school children attend public schools.170 Under all three proposals, parents of 
children already in public schools could take advantage of tuition tax credit, so long as they were 
below certain income levels under the First and Second Substitutes.171 While the program in 
Zelman offered all parents some level of assistance, it does not appear that the Zelman court 
required that all parents receive assistance, and Utah’s legislature means-testing the benefit 
seems like a reasonable step to equitably spread the benefits of the tuition tax credit. The 
program in Zelman did offer reimbursement for public as well as private school costs,172 while 
the Utah proposals only offer reimbursement for private school costs.173 However, in Utah public 
schools do not charge tuition,174 and charter schools statutorily cannot charge tuition.175 It is 
unreasonable to argue that either the Utah proposals fail under the Establishment Clause because 
they do not provide a tax credit for non-existent public school tuition (essentially a meaningless 
tax credit) or that the tax credit would pass muster, but only if Utah’s public schools charged 
tuition. The Constitutionality of a school choice tuition should not turn on whether or not the 
public schools charge tuition. 
The Utah tuition tax credit proposals also direct aid to religious schools only as a result of 
genuine and independent choices by parents. Much like the school voucher program in Zelman 
did not constitute the government making direct payments to religious schools; the tuition tax 
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credit funnels money to Utah parents who then might choose to send their children to religious 
schools. Utah’s public school parents could choose among free public schools, an increasing 
number of tuition free charter schools176, and various private schools, both religious and secular. 
In Zelman parents could choose among public, community, magnet, and private (secular and 
religious) schools, and those parents keeping their children in public schools could benefit from 
tutoring vouchers.177 The Supreme Court deemed this a genuine and independent choice, and 
under the Utah proposals, parents would have a variety of choices. Further, much like in Zelman,
the tuition tax credits offered no financial incentive to choose a religious school over a charter 
school, public school, or secular private school. While the Utah proposals do not have the tutor 
reimbursement program that the Zelman featured, the second two proposals offered $1.5 million 
in aid only to public schools who demonstrate harm from the tuition tax credit regime. Further, 
the Court in Zelman did not state that all of the elements of the Ohio program were necessary for 
the program to pass muster under Lemon’s second prong, and it is not likely Zelman would have 
turned out differently if Ohio had not offered the tutoring reimbursement component. 
2. The Utah Proposals Compared to Mueller and Nyquist 
In Mueller, the Court upheld a tax deduction for tuition and other costs related to private 
and public school attendance.178 Similar to the Mueller tax deduction, benefits accruing to any 
religious school under the tuition tax credit proposals would only occur after parents choose (1) 
to take their child out of a public school and then (2) to put their child in a religious school. 
Parents in both Minnesota and Utah might keep their children in public schools or might put 
them in secular, nonreligious private schools. Much like the Mueller tax deduction encouraged 
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private, independent choices, the Utah proposals would result in parental choices among a 
variety of religious and nonreligious options. The Utah tuition tax credit proposals are also 
neutral with respect to religion, and much like the deduction Mueller, the proposed credit made 
no distinction between religious and secular schools. 
In Nyquist, the Court concluded that New York impermissibly designed the tax credit 
program to benefit private schools, including religious schools.179 The proposed Utah program’s 
design primarily benefits parents, students, and the public school system by reducing the strain 
on the system.180 Further, the continuing validity of Nyquist is in at least some doubt. While the 
Zelman court cited Nyquist and did not overturn it,181 in some ways the majority is at odds with 
Nyquist,182 unless one believes skillfully framing the purposes of the statute is essential to 
validity under the Establishment Clause. The substance of the programs in Zelman and Nyquist 
are not that different: both include government aid to schools that happens as a result of parental 
choice. Nyquist is over thirty years old, and is probably at best a good exposition of the law when 
a statute intends to benefit private schools.  
b. Equal Protection Clause Analysis 
 
This analysis will begin by briefly considering the Equal Protection Clause implications 
of the adjusted gross income limitations on taking the proposed Utah tuition tax credits, and then 
it will consider the implications of the proposals’ different definitions of “qualifying student.” 
The First and Second Substitutes means-test the benefit of the tuition tax credit, i.e., the 
lower the parents’ income, the higher the higher the possible tuition tax credit.183 This does not 
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create an Equal Protection Clause problem. The federal government has a progressive tax 
system, as low income individuals pay taxes at a very low rate, and as taxable income increases, 
the income tax rates increase, to a current maximum of thirty-five percent.184 Many states also 
have progressive tax rates.185 Fundamental fairness and equity are compelling state interests 
justifying treating upper income taxpayers different from poorer taxpayers, as upper income 
taxpayers generally can bear the burden of higher taxes in a more equitable way than low income 
taxpayers. Further, the educational assistance program in Zelman was progressive, as poorer 
parents received an increased voucher amount.186 The Zelman court did not consider an Equal 
Protection challenge to the Ohio school voucher program. 
The definition of “qualifying student” does have Equal Protection Clause implications. 
Recall that the First Substitute contained no restrictions on the definition of a qualifying child, 
but the Original version and the Second Substitute excluded most children who were in private 
school on January 1, 2005.187 The Second Substitute did provide that students who were in 
private school on January 1, 2005 could qualify, but only if their parents’ adjusted gross income 
was 100 percent or less of the federal reduced meal income eligibility guidelines.188 The First 
Substitute had no such restriction: almost any child attending private school, regardless of where 
they attended school on January 1, 2005, was a “qualifying child.”189 
An example will help illustrate the Equal Protection Clause issue. Imagine that in 2005 
the Utah Legislature enacted the refundable tuition tax credit of the Second Substitute. Imagine 
two children, Kyle and Eric. Both were born on January 1, 1998 and live in Utah. On January 1, 
 
184 I.R.C. § 1. 
185 E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-104 (2004) (Utah’s income tax rates start at 2.3% and increase to 7.0%); VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-320 (West 2005) (Virginia’s income tax rates start at 2% and increase to 5.75%). 
186 Supra Part III.B. 
187 Supra Part II. 
188 Id.  
189 Id.  
26
2005, Kyle attended Public School A, while Eric attended Private School B. On January 1, 2006, 
Private School B goes out of business, so Eric transfers to Public School A. On July 1, 2008 both 
Kyle’s and Eric’s parents, wanting their children to receive a better education, transfer their 
children to Private School C. In 2009, both sets of parents pay $3,250 in tuition to Private School 
C. Kyle and Eric are both only children and are dependents of their mother and father. Kyle’s 
and Eric’s parents both have an adjusted gross income of $41,459 in 2009, which is 135 percent 
of the federal income guidelines for reduced school meals.190 
Since Kyle attended public school in Utah on January 1, 2005, in 2009 his parents can 
claim a refundable tuition tax credit of $3,250 for Utah income tax purposes under the Second 
Substitute, as that is the maximum credit allowed for adjusted gross incomes in the 125 to 150 
percent of income eligibility guideline range.191 Eric’s parents, similarly situated to Kyle’s 
parents in 2009, are unable to claim the tuition tax credit, as Eric was in private school on 
January 1, 2005. Under this scenario, Eric’s parents pay Utah $1,402 in tax for 2009, while 
Kyle’s parents pay no income tax and receive $1,848 from the state of Utah.192 While this 
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example dealt only with the Second Substitute, a rather similar inequitable result would happen 
under the Original version: Eric’s parents pay $1,402 in Utah income taxes, while Kyle’s parents 
pay no tax and receive $223 from Utah.193 
As seen in Nordlinger, statutes creating large differences in taxes paid by similarly 
situated taxpayers are not per se invalid, but there must be some rational purpose for the 
difference.194 The purposes of the tuition tax credit included empowering parents to make the 
best educational decision for their children and to help alleviate the burden on the Utah public 
schools.195 The distinction between Kyle’s and Eric’s parents in 2009, based on where their sons 
attended school in 2005, in no rational way advances the purposes of the statute. This is very 
different than the situation in Nordlinger, where concerns over the stability of neighborhoods and 
the inequity of having to pay massive property tax hikes on unrealized appreciation in home 
values were valid state interests rationally related to the distinction created by Proposition 13.196 
The substantial difference in tax treatment between Kyle’s parents and Eric’s parents is 
not the equitable distribution of the tax burden the Supreme Court supported in Madden.197 It is 
entirely inequitable to have Kyle’s parents pay negative income taxes while Eric’s parents pay 
$1,400 in taxes based on where their children attended school four years earlier. The Court 
 
50%). UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-114(2)(b)(i) (2004). They can also deduct the same standard deduction they used 
for federal income tax purposes ($10,000). UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-104.1(1)(b) (2004). Additionally, they can 
claim personal exemptions of $7,200 ($2,400 per person). Utah State Tax Commission, Individual Income Tax: TC-
40 Forms and Instructions 6 (2005), available at http://tax.utah.gov/forms/current/tc-40inst.pdf. This leads to a Utah 
taxable income of $23,845 ($41,459-$774-$10,000-$7,200). Under Utah law, their income tax will be $362 plus 
seven percent of their income over $8,626. UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-104(3) (2004). The math yields a 2009 Utah 
income tax of $1,402 ($362 X (($23,845-$8,626) X 7%).  
This is what Eric’s parents pay in Utah income taxes. Under the Second Substitute, Kyle’s parents can claim a 
$3,250 refundable tuition tax credit; hence they pay no Utah income tax in 2009 and receive $1,848 ($3,250 minus 
$1,402) from Utah. 
193 The Original version only offered a 50 percent tax credit, so Kyle’s parents, instead of owing $1,402 in Utah 
taxes, receive $223 from the state in 2005 ($1,625 (fifty percent of tuition paid) minus $1,402). 
194 Supra Part III.D. 
195 Supra Part II.   
196 Supra Part III.D. 
197 Id.  
28
usually looks to the purpose of the statute to find a substantial state interest to justify a 
distinction in similarly situated taxpayers.198 The proposed distinction between Kyle’s parents 
and Eric’s parents is similar to the distinction between Vermont residents and non-residents 
purchasing out-of-state property the Court struck down in Williams.
The Court also disfavors distinctions between similarly situated taxpayers based upon 
status on or after a certain date when the distinction serves no rational relationship to the statute’s 
purpose. The Original version’s and Second Substitute’s distinction based on whether Kyle and 
Eric attended private school on January 1, 2005 is similar to New Mexico’s residency distinction 
in Hooper. The problem of Kyle’s and Eric’s parents can be cast in residency terms. If both Kyle 
and Eric attended private schools on January 1, 2005, but Kyle lived in Arizona and moved to 
Utah on January 1, 2006, under the Second Substitute his parents would receive the tuition tax 
credit in 2009 by dint of his not living in Utah on January 1, 2005, while Eric’s parents would be 
denied the credit by dint of having lived in Utah on January 1, 2005.199 The Original version 
does not contain an out-of-state on January 1, 2005 qualifier for the credit,200 so it is not 
vulnerable to this problem. But both the Original and the Second Substitute convey a tax benefit 
for several years (i.e., the analysis in 2009 would apply to 2008 and after 2009, assuming both 
sets of parents keep paying private school tuition) based on a past distinction between Kyle and 
Eric that bares no rational relationship to the purposes of the statute.201 This is similar to the 
invalid distinction in Hooper that make a distinction conveying tax benefits to one group of 
taxpayers based on a past distinction that bore no legitimate relationship to the statute’s purpose. 
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While the Original version and Second Substitute, which create a dramatic tax distinction 
between two similarly situated sets of parents, create an Equal Protection Clause problem, the 
First Substitute does not run into the same problem. Recall that the only distinction among 
parents paying the same private school tuition is one based on income: the lower the income, the 
higher the possible credit.202 Means-testing a tax benefit does not create an Equal Protection 
problem, as it is a way to distribute the tax burden equitably. Of the three 2005 proposals, only 
the First Substitute is free of Equal Protection problems. 
Why then was the First Substitute changed in the Second Substitute to disqualify most 
parents whose children were in Utah private schools on January 1, 2005 from taking the tuition 
tax credit? As discussed above, the change addressed fiscal concerns, as legislators deemed the 
cost to the Utah fisc of allowing these parents to claim the credit excessive.203 However, the 
Supreme Court has not held that lost revenue is a legitimate state interest to allow a tax 
distinction between similarly situated taxpayers.204 Even in Madden the Court allowed very 
different rates of tax on in and out-of-state accounts because of enforcement problems (i.e., it is 
harder to collect taxes from out-of-state accounts), not because of fiscal concerns.205 If fiscal 
concerns were a legitimate state interest for Equal Protection Clause purposes, a state legislature 
could enact higher taxes on any group based on any distinction, and then justify it by claiming it 
results in more tax revenue for the State. Clearly that is not permissible under the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
c. Recommendations for Utah’s Legislature 
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As the Utah school choice debate continues206, the Legislature needs to be cognizant of 
Constitutional concerns the next time it crafts a choice program such as a tuition tax credit. All 
the 2005 proposals were valid under the Establishment Clause. The Legislature should only enact 
school choice programs that are broadly available to a large group of parents, that do not favor 
religious schools over secular schools, and that allow parents to make a choice based upon the 
best interests of their children. 
The First Substitute was the only 2005 proposal to pass both the Establishment Clause 
and the Equal Protection Clause. Should the Legislature in 2007 or beyond consider a tuition tax 
credit, it should make sure such a credit treats similarly situated taxpayers in an equal way. 
Distinctions based upon income, such as means-testing the credit and reducing the benefit for 
upper income taxpayers are valid. But distinctions based on a student’s status on a date certain 
are questionable and the Legislature should avoid such distinctions to ensure validity under the 
Equal Protection Clause. If the Legislature needs to meet fiscal constraints, it should consider 
alternate options, such as reducing the credit upper-income parents receive. 
V. CONCLUSION 
School choice programs, including tuition tax credit proposals, continue to present 
Constitutional concerns. Legislators must craft such proposals carefully to ensure that they 
comply with both the Establishment Clause and the Equal Protection Clause, while providing the 
desired choices to parents and not excessively draining the public fisc. In order to conform to the 
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause, a school choice program must have a secular 
purpose, be neutral toward religion, and be directed to a broad class of individuals who exercise 
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a genuine and independent choice as to how to allocate their benefit dollars.207 The Utah tuition 
tax credit proposals were all crafted in a manner sufficient to meet these requirements and thus 
pass muster under the Establishment Clause. 
 If a state legislature wants to implement a school choice program via a tuition tax credit, 
it must avoid creating distinctions among similarly situated taxpayers that violate the Equal 
Protection Clause. While well intended, the Original and Second Substitute proposals created a 
situation where taxpayers with the exact same economic circumstances would pay dramatically 
different amounts of Utah income taxes.208 State legislatures should craft future tuition tax credit 
legislation that makes distinctions between taxpayers based on only on income, which is a valid 
and equitable way to confer differing benefits to taxpayers under the Equal Protection Clause. 
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